This paper studies the relevance of strategic trade effects in the environmental policy for European electricity sector. The production, investment and trade of electricity are modelled for four European countries. Two market regimes are distinguished: perfect competition and Cournot competition. The model is used to examine the strategic trade effects of unilateral environmental policy decisions, as we allow for greenhouse tax changes, nuclear bans and subsidies to nuclear power.
INTRODUCTION
The electricity sector is an important source of pollution. According to the European Union Energy Outlook (1999) the European electricity sector was responsible for 38.5% of all European (EU15) CO 2 emissions in 1995. It also contributes substantially to SO 2 , NO x and Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) emissions. Virtually all generation technologies have some negative impact on the environment 1 . European countries have regulated the environmental aspects of electricity generation since the late 70's. At present the most relevant and widespread form of European regulation is the application of technical emission standards prescribed by the 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive for SO 2 , NO x and TSP (LCPD/88). The proposal of a European CO 2 tax has long being debated and at the present no formal agreement has yet been reached. At the national level, the regulatory issue most relevant for the environment is probably the nuclear phase-out in some countries.
As elsewhere in the world, the European electricity sector is undergoing a substantial restructuring process. In 1996 a European directive set goals and the modalities of the liberalisation and of the unification of the internal electricity market 2 . This directive stipulates that the market opening takes place in three stages 3 . After 2006, all consumers will be admitted to the market. National countries are required to allow access to their electricity sector by means of both non-discriminatory pricing of electricity transmission, and by means of non-discriminatory procedures for construction of new generation capacity.
The interaction between environmental policy and market liberalisation is likely to bring about important consequences for the European citizen's welfare. As Burtraw et al. (2000) point out, liberalisation can affect the environment by means of four factors: changes in overall electricity demand in reaction to prices for other energy products; changes in the merit order and in the relative efficiency of alternative generation technologies; and finally, because of direct effects of the market structure on firms' behaviour.
In our analysis we adopt a partial equilibrium approach; thus we disregard the first interaction factor. Our focus will instead be on the two other interaction factors. In the case of the European electricity sector, in fact, market liberalisation does not necessary lead to perfect 1 See European Union's (1999) ExternE report for a detailed description of environmental impacts of the electricity sector. 2 Directive 96/92/EC. 3 By February 1999, final consumers with an annual consumption in excess of 40 GW were able to shop around Europe to satisfy their electricity needs. A further opening to consumers with more than 20 GWh demanded per year is supposed took place in 2000. In 2003 also consumers whose annual consumption exceeds 9 GWh will be admitted to the market.
competition. The presence of very large producers in some European countries coupled with a sub-optimal international transmission capacity will most probably lead to monopolistic competition in the transition phase. This could lead to an additional interaction factor between liberalisation and market policy. We know from the literature on Trade and Environment, that in an international oligopoly, government may have an incentive to replace trade policies forbidden by international agreements with distortions in their environmental policies.
To anticipate the main contents of this paper, we use a multi-country model for the European electricity market to address five issues:
1. Who benefits from imperfect competition?
2. Does imperfect competition help to meet environmental targets?
3. Is there an incentive for individual countries to relax their environmental policy as predicted by the strategic trade literature?
4. Can countries profit from a unilateral nuclear ban?
5. Can some countries gain by subsidising their own nuclear production?
Overall, our analysis suggests that market power cannot be neglected in an assessment of environmental policies for the electricity sector.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical literature on Trade and Environment. Section 3 looks at the empirical literature on environmental policy and the electricity sector. Section 4 introduces our model by means of a simple theoretical framework. Section 5 presents the assumptions and the results of our numerical model. Section 6 concludes.
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN OPEN ECONOMIES
A non-competitive market for electricity in Europe has important consequences for the way environmental and energy policies can be implemented.
Trade under oligopolistic competition is characterised by positive profits. This provides an incentive to national governments to help domestic firms earn higher profits in the international arena. To this purpose, indirect commitment devices may be used when explicit trade policies 4 are forbidden by trade agreements. National environmental policies have a direct influence on production costs of firms. Given the objective differences in the environmental situation of each country, their strategic use cannot easily be detected and prohibited. Thus, environmental policy makes a good candidate for an indirect trade policy device. From this idea stems quite a large literature on the interaction between environmental policy and trade. The first applications are due to Barrett (1994) for environmental standards and Conrad (1993, 1995) for taxes. These studies show that, compared to first best policies based on the rule that equates marginal social benefit to marginal social cost, environmental policies chosen by governments in the Nash equilibrium are tougher under Bertrand competition and less stringent under Cournot competition.
The world economy generally assumed in these models is very simplified, with just two countries, one producer per country, homogeneous products, a single technology, domestic pollution and the whole output sold to a third country. Kennedy (1994) These issues have not been studied yet in a theoretical framework. However at least the generation capacity aspects and the differences in environmental impacts among technologies, are related to those studied in the literature on strategic innovation and the environment (for instance Ulph (1994 ) Ulph (1996 ), and Ulph and Ulph (1996 . In these papers, a role analogous to the one of capacity investments is played by R&D expenditures.
The first two papers consider respectively process and environmental (i.e. emissionreducing) R&D. The third paper considers them jointly, proving that they have the same distortionary effect on environmental policy. In general, however, it remains ambiguous whether this will lead to environmental policies that are stricter or more lax than first best ones. Finally, the dynamic analysis by Feenstra (1998) considers explicitly the role of investments, but her analysis is confined to the case of a single technology.
The theoretical literature shows that governments have indeed incentives to distort their environmental policies in an international oligopolistic market, but the magnitude and the direction of the incentives remains ambiguous. Moreover, theoretical models necessarily give an oversimplified depiction of the reality, and thus cannot capture all the complexity of the European electricity sector. Wei and Smeers (1997, parts I and II) , consider an imperfectly competitive electricity market for three European Countries under alternative assumptions regarding short run price determination: either optimal spot pricing or second lowest marginal cost pricing. These studies have a two stage structure: first, a long run Cournot equilibrium in capacities is computed, then prices and output are determined according to the institutional assumptions regarding the short run price setting. Their representation of the European electricity market however is too sketchy to derive any policy conclusion, and they are mostly interested in demonstrating that their algorithm reaches a unique equilibrium.
ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The only model we are aware of that assesses the European environmental policy within an imperfect competition framework is Böhringer et al. (2001) . They present a general equilibrium model for Germany and consider, like Holster (1997) a unilateral introduction of a CO 2 tax. They find that the resulting shift towards less carbon-intensive industries is more pronounced under imperfect than under perfect competition, but their cost appraisal does not yield clear-cut results. Moreover, they assume that market power in the electricity is sector not very high, positioning de-facto this paper at the borderline between perfect competition and oligopolistic competition analysis.
THE MODEL: A SIMPLE DESCRIPTION.
In order to highlight the main issues our numerical model will deal with, we present here a very simplified static version of our model. A description of the full model is provided in Appendix A. In this section we focus on the simple problem of two countries, labelled Home and Foreign, that host an electricity producer each, and that are interconnected by two international transmission lines with fixed capacity and . 
The production stage
In the production stage, firms minimise the cost of producing any output level i Q , and choose how much to produce, and where to sell their production, in order to maximise their profits. We assume that each country sells on the domestic market ii Q 
The investment stage
In the investment stage, firms set the capacities of their plants taking as given the environmental policies of the governments, in order to maximise profits for any level of output.
In other words, in this stage firms commit to a generation capacity level that would put them in the best conditions to compete. In our dynamic model, the commitment to an optimal level of investment will be characterised by In an open loop setting, firms' equilibrium strategies are set once and for all for the whole time horizon at the beginning of the game and never revised at any point in time. This, besides perfect foresight, requires, on the part of the firms, perfect ability to commit to the investment and production path originally chosen. Investments in power capacity once undertaken cannot be easily undone, and this determines also the optimal output subsequently produced. In a feedback equilibrium it would always be possible for a firm to announce at the beginning of the game a certain investment and/or output for a year t, just to find out in year t-1 that such strategy would not be optimal from the following year onward, given the strategy path presently announced by its rival. Although this is slightly more realistic, we prefer to focus on open-loop equilibria both because they are numerically more tractable, and because we intend to stress the commitment properties of investments. 
The foreign government has an analogous objective function.
From the trade and environment literature, we expect that governments do not apply first best environmental policies. Instead, they would distort them in order to increase domestic welfare at the expense of the rival country 8 .
Governments face conflicting incentives stemming from the consumer surplus part of their objective function. The welfare of the consumers depends partly on electricity imports, and partly on domestic production. As pointed out by Kennedy (1994) , incrementing the first component calls for more strict environmental policies, while incrementing the second calls for less stringent environmental policies. In our model, the problem is compounded by the fact that international trade is bounded by the capacity of international connection lines. This limits the amount of electricity that can be imported, and hence the incentive for the governments to set overly restrictive policies. We would then expect that the concern for the welfare of consumers would rather push the governments towards less strict environmental policies.
The incentives stemming from the profit component of the welfare function are more straightforward. The government would set less stringent environmental policies if this contributes to commit the national producer to lower production costs (without generating excessive environmental damages).
In our simulations the Environmental policy stage is not modelled in an extensive way. We content ourselves with evaluating ex-post unilateral deviations from first-best environmental policies, without characterising a full Nash equilibrium in the policy game.
SIMULATION EXERCISES
In this section, we address the questions raised in the introduction by means of the multinodal dynamic computable model of the European electricity sector described in Appendix A.
We present the data and the assumptions in section 5.1. Section 5.2 summarizes and discusses the results relevant for each question.
Assumptions and Data Used 8
The focus of the model is on the electricity sector of Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany, for a time horizon of 35 years.
Whilst we intend to capture many of the differences among the four countries by means of country-specific data, we do take some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we assume that the shape of the demand functions and the way consumers allocate their purchases of electricity through sub-periods do not depend on their place of residence. Moreover, in each country there is just one producer who can generate electric power using several plants.
Whilst this is a realistic hypothesis for France, Belgium and the Netherlands, where market concentration is very high, it amounts to a serious simplification of the German electricity industry. At least three large generators can be found there. Our hypothesis of a single national producer means that they behave like a cartel.
We also assume that fuels prices and relative growth rates are determined on the world market and are exogenous. Fuel prices are shown in Figure 1 Producers have at their disposal the technologies described in Table 3 .
In a cost-minimizing framework, from Figure 2 and Table 3 , one would expect that coal and nuclear plants, given their low running costs to be used first, whereas gas turbines would be more likely used to cope with peak demand. As to investments in new capacity, we expect the relationship between investment on one hand and fuel and other variable costs on the other, to play a major role in the technology choices of the producers, with expensive units installed only if they guarantee low operation costs.
Notwithstanding these generalisations, the four countries remain very different from each other in several dimensions. In particular, the electricity demanded in 2000, the installed capacity for each technology in 2000, the external costs of each pollutant, the share of small consumers in total demand (and, consequently, average demand elasticity 9 ), the demand's growth rates, and finally the pre-existing environmental policies are different in each country. 9 We assume point elasticity of -0.40 for residential consumers and -0.70 for large consumers. As a measure of the different degree of noxiousness of different pollutants, we refer to the ExternE estimates of the external damages of air emissions. Given the linearity of our damage function, these estimates can be regarded as marginal damages as it was assumed in Bigano et al. (2000) . These estimates are reported in Table 4 along with other countryspecific data, and are used as a base for the ex-post welfare evaluation of the various scenarios examined. We consider only environmental damages caused by emissions of air pollutants and hence we disregard other external effects (e.g. accident risk for nuclear plants) 10 .
For demand data, we draw upon the estimates used in the European Union Energy Outlook to 2020. From Table 4 below, one notices that the modalities of electricity generation differ strongly among countries. For instance, France relies more heavily on nuclear generation than the other countries; gas turbines are more widespread in the Netherlands, whereas the share of coal plants is still important in Germany. Finally, we assume different interconnection capacities between each pair of countries. Given the lack of available data, we derived our assumed capacities from the maximum monthly value of load flows between countries 12 and we increased those figures by 10%. These capacities are shown in 
Simulation Results
In order to provide answers to our policy issues, we compute all scenarios, under two assumptions: perfect and Cournot competition. All scenarios have a common starting point: a regulated price in the period 2000-2004. Instead of presenting each scenario in turn, we prefer to focus directly on the difference between scenarios. The scenarios considered are listed in Table 6 below:
Scenario Characteristics
Business 
Who benefits from imperfect competition?
Our simulations confirm the traditional result that imperfect competition reduces aggregate welfare, and that the benefits stemming from monopoly profits and lower environmental damages are more than compensated by the decrease in consumers' surplus. Table 7 illustrates this outcome. by the presence of a CO 2 tax. France and Germany are net exporters of electricity, while
Belgium and The Netherlands are net importers as shown in Figures 2A and 2B . In fact, Germany and France have much larger available capacities in cheap base load technologies than Belgium and The Netherlands and are always able to export some of their production. 
Does imperfect competition help to meet environmental targets?
Given the partial equilibrium setting of our model, we should distinguish between targets clearly specified for the electricity sector, such as the Belgian and Dutch covenants on SO 2 and NO x emission, and targets specified for the whole national economy, such as CO 2 targets under the Kyoto Protocol. For the second type of targets, we measure the reduction in total CO 2 emissions in the electricity sector. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Imperfect competition brings about two effects that have a direct influence on the stringency of environmental policy: technology substitution and output reduction. Note that it is not granted that the first factor will lead to the adoption of less polluting technologies. As a matter of fact, from Table 7 one notices that environmental damages actually increase in the Netherlands under Cournot competition. This is due to the fact that output reduction in this country mainly affects the investment in new nuclear, wind and gas plants (which have no or very low air emissions) while the use of waste incinerators and kerosene plants actually increases. In practice, the Dutch generator has less need to invest in extra base-load capacity, given the higher prices prevailing under imperfect competition. It is more profitable to invest in plants more suitable for peak-load generation, such as waste incinerators and kerosene plants, which however bring about substantial emissions. Delta Emissions CO2 As to the welfare effects of a European Kyoto tax, consider Table 8 . 
Is there an incentive for individual countries to relax their environmental policy as predicted by the strategic trade literature?
In order to fully answer this question, one should in principle compute the Nash equilibrium of the game in which each country sets its environmental policies taking as given the environmental policies of the other countries. We do not take this option, both because it is computationally very demanding, and because, within the European Union, countries do not enjoy complete freedom in their environmental policy choices. The targets set in European Directives or in the international protocols subscribed heavily limit their strategy space.
However, countries are given some leeway in the implementation of these targets. We ask ourselves, therefore, whether national governments would be interested in small unilateral deviations from the CO 2 tax set to the common marginal damage level of 18 Euros/ton. The results are shown in the following tables. Table 9A . Unilateral deviations from CO 2 tax under Cournot competition in Belgium (Bn EURO). 16 The implementation of a CO2 tax also helps meeting the SO2 and NOx targets. From the comparison of Table 7 with Table 8 , one notices that the decrease in damages from these pollutants is more pronounced In Belgium under a CO2 tax, whereas in the Netherlands the increase in SO2 damages is smaller. This happens because of the correlation between emission factors across technologies. A plant that emits significant amounts of CO2 is likely to have significant SO2 and NOx emissions as well. Therefore a policy aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, in absence of specific abatement technology, will lead to reduction in the emissions of other pollutants, through output reductions from the polluting plants. This is true both under perfect and imperfect competition. Table 9A shows the differences from the outcome under full taxes of unilateral reductions to 90%, 80% …40% of the same tax in Belgium, while in the other countries the tax is kept constant. Table 9B to 9D show the same thing for Germany, France and The Netherlands.   Two facts are clear from Tables 9A-9D . First, incentives to deviate depend on which environmental damages are included in the welfare function of the governments; second, some countries may welcome unilateral deviations on the parts of their rivals.
As to the first point, notice that if only CO 2 damages are taken into account, each of the four countries would welcome any unilateral reduction of its own tax. However, when the damages of all pollutants are included in the welfare function, only the Netherlands would still find it always profitable to deviate, Germany would never find it profitable, Belgium would welcome reduction of at least 50%, France would consider either small reductions (up to 20%) or very large reductions (at least 60%). This uneven result finds its main explanation in the differences in marginal damages of SO 2 , NO x and TSP emissions across countries, and in the technologies adopted. Germany pollutes more and values the damages from these three pollutants more than the Netherlands. Given the correlation among pollutants, reducing the CO 2 tax has harsher consequences in Germany than in the Netherlands. Moreover, the main effect of modifications in the CO 2 tax in a country is that either the output levels of operating plants are affected or, for large modifications, the merit order of the plants in that country changes accordingly. This implies that welfare effects of unilateral deviations can be discontinuous, reflecting the switch from less polluting to more polluting plants. This could also explain the non-monotonic pattern of social welfare in Belgium and France. As long as operating plant output is expanded as a response to mild reductions in domestic CO 2 taxes, the welfare trade-off is limited to output (and hence domestic surplus) expansion versus increased emissions (and hence, domestic damages) from the same plants. For more substantial reductions, the producer may find it profitable to switch production to dirtier plants with considerably lower operating cost, and the resulting increase in profits and consumers' surplus may well compensate the increase in environmental damages, especially if their marginal value is not too high.
In some instances countries can benefit from unilateral deviations on the part of their rivals.
This can happen for two main reasons. Consumers benefit from cheaper imports, and domestic emissions fall as a consequence of the reduction of domestic production. This is Kennedy's (1994) "pollution shifting" effect. In our simulations, this effect is prevailing, for instance, in Belgium as a consequence of unilateral reductions of 10, 30 and 40% in France's CO 2 tax. More often however, fiercer competition from the deviating country reduces welfare in rival countries, both because of the fall in national producers' profits, and because the rival producers are forced to adopt dirtier technology to sustain competition, in a sort of a race to the bottom.
Notice that a unilateral tax reduction not always induces a fall in the profits of the rival countries (in fact this happens consistently in our simulations only for unilateral deviations in Germany). Given the discrete nature of technology adoption decisions, and the different transmission capacities of international lines, if a non-deviating country looses market share on a given market as a consequence of a tax reduction in another country, it is not granted that the deviating country would be able to cover it fully. Then some other country could be in a position to satisfy the residual demand, thus expanding its own market share and its profits.
Can countries profit from a nuclear ban?
The popularity of nuclear power generation is rapidly decreasing in Europe. Many European countries have already given up this option, Germany has opted in June 2000 after a long debate, for a nuclear phase-out by 2010, and Belgium has announced in July 1999 a phase out for this generation technology to be carried out within 2020. Much of this trend is due to political acceptability reasons but some claim that nuclear power is losing competitiveness vis-à-vis conventional fuel technologies.
In this section we assess whether this claim is substantiated or the political side of the issue is the determinant one. We consider two versions of nuclear ban. The first one considers the prohibition of new investments in nuclear capacity in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands from 2010 onwards. The second one differs from the first one because it allows new investments in nuclear capacity in Germany.
Given our cost data, it appears that a ban on new investments in nuclear technology is never a good idea for a country in isolation. As Table 10 shows, the only winner from the imposition of a nuclear ban is the exempted country (France), both under Cournot competition and under perfect competition. The gain for France is, all in all, very small. This is caused by the very restricted international transmission capacity. A nuclear ban is detrimental both for producers and consumers, because it forces the adoption of more expensive technologies, and brings about an increase in environmental damages that can be quite substantial when all pollutants are accounted for. . Hence the program may find a superior outcome in which the welfare increases for the "nuclear" countries more than compensate the losses for the "non nuclear" countries. The latter are still forced to adopt less efficient technologies than nuclear, but transportation costs and/or transmission capacity constraints may prevent them from benefiting from cost reductions occurring in the country where the ban has been lifted.
Note that the benefit from lifting the ban on nuclear in Germany in terms of environmental damage reduction is substantial under both market regimes. The nuclear phase-out program recently decided by the German government can then find a sound justification only by very high values attached to external costs and accident risks for the nuclear technology. 
Can a country gain by subsidising its own nuclear production?
Suppose that the distortionary use of environmental taxes is precluded by some binding international agreement. Is there any other way government can disguise their trade policy?
Can some energy policy decisions serve this purpose?
A simple way to use energy policy for trade purposes is to subsidise certain technologies on security of supply grounds or with the official intent of subsidizing local fuel extraction. An example of the second kind of policy is the German policy towards domestically produced
lignite. An example of the first kind is the French nuclear policy. We focus on this second Table 12 below compares two different ways of providing a 25% subsidy to French nuclear investments in presence of a CO2 tax. The left half of Table 12 illustrates the case in which the French government recycles taxes on profits and on CO2 emissions to pay directly for 25% of the cost of nuclear investments. The right half of Table 12 illustrates the case in which the French government provides indirect subsidisation by simplifying bureaucratic procedures for authorisation or by similar preferential behaviour; that is, in a way that does not imply a direct payment by the citizens. Table 12 shows that the attractiveness of nuclear subsidization for France hinges on which form of competition takes place, but more importantly on who pays for the subsidy.
Indirect subsidization is a costless reduction of investment cost, and therefore it improves welfare under both market regimes. Producer profits decrease in France under perfect competition, but aggregate welfare increases.
As shown on the left half of table 12, if tax revenue must be recycled in order to provide a subsidy, this remains an attractive policy option only under imperfect competition, and only if damages from all air pollutants are taken into account. In this case in fact, nuclear subsidization is beneficial in three ways: it increases profits trough a strategic mechanism similar to an environmental tax reduction; it increases consumer surplus trough domestic output expansion; and it reduces harmful emissions. The sum of these three effects is enough to counterbalance the tax revenue reduction. Under perfect competition, however, only the two latter effects are present, while the effect on profit is negative. Moreover, under perfect competition a larger reduction in tax revenue is necessary to finance the subsidization of a higher level of investments.
Note that, as in the case of unilateral tax distortions, an advantage for a country can be good news for other countries as well. In particular, Germany benefits from the subsidy in France -3.98 9.19 2.52 -0.28 -3.98 9.19 10.12 -0.28 Curnot Competition
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because of the resulting domestic emission contraction, especially under Cournot competition. In this setting, the Dutch and the Belgian producer also increase their profits.
Given the discrete nature of technology adoption decisions, and the different transmission capacities of international lines, it is not granted that the French generator would be able to fully cover the market share lost by the German generator as a consequence of the competitive advantage provided by the subsidy. Then the Dutch and the Belgian producer can expand their market shares and profits by satisfying the residual demand.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used a dynamic numerical model to assess the importance of the degree of competition for the implementation of environmental policies within the European Electricity sector.
Our model compares the widely used perfect competition paradigm with a multi-market Cournot model with transmission constraints. Our environmental policy focus has been on the stringency of environmental policies under imperfect versus perfect competition, and on the consequences of unilateral distortions of a CO 2 tax. Moreover, we assessed whether a ban on nuclear investments could have some rationale other than political preferences, and whether a unilateral subsidization of nuclear investments in France could provide strategic advantages to this country.
Our simulations confirm that perfect competition is clearly superior to imperfect competition when it comes to welfare comparisons. The higher profits and the lower environmental damages that result from imperfect competition fail to compensate for the huge losses in consumer surplus. In our framework, this result is reinforced by two factors. On one hand, the limited international transmission capacity leaves significant local market power to generators on their domestic markets. On the other hand, the decrease in output under imperfect competition is sometimes accompanied by a shift towards more polluting technologies, thus reducing the beneficial environmental effects of lower output levels.
As a consequence, our results on the interaction between the market regime and environmental targets are mixed. Whilst the stringency of sulfur dioxide targets declines under imperfect competition, sulfur dioxide targets become more difficult to reach under imperfect competition. As to CO 2 taxes, their implementation under imperfect competition leads to deadweight losses, and hence, the lower emission levels are reached at a social cost.
Moreover, although overall CO 2 emissions are higher under perfect competition, some countries actually experience higher CO 2 levels in some years under Cournot competition.
Our investigation on strategic incentives showed that the appeal of unilateral deviations depends crucially on which kind of objective function the governments have. If they take into account damages from all pollutants, the attractiveness of unilateral deviations declines sharply compared to the case in which they take only carbon emission damages into account.
An interesting and somewhat surprising collateral result is that some governments may welcome unilateral deviations on the part of their opponents. We singled out two factors that may explain this result. On one hand, Kennedy's (1994) "pollution shifting" effect induces governments to welcome to a certain extent electricity imports because of the induced increase in consumers' surplus and decrease in domestic emissions. On the other hand, in presence of transmission constraints and several technologies, a unilateral deviation may cause a rival to loose more market share than the generator based in the deviating country is actually able to cover. Other producers may then jump in and cover the residual demand.
We have also shown that letting other principles than cost-minimization lead technology choices may have unwelcome consequences. In particular, a ban on nuclear technology makes sense only in presence of very high external costs attached to nuclear electricity generation, especially in Germany where conventional fuels cause very high environmental damages.
On the other hand, direct subsidization of the French nuclear generation sector makes sense only under imperfect competition, if the subsidy must be financed using taxes directly accruing from the electricity sector. If budget balance is not an issue, a cost decrease is obviously always welfare improving.
Overall, our simulations suggest that that it is worthwhile taking into consideration factors that may lead to preservation of market power, when evaluating environmental policies for the electricity sector. In particular, if international transmission capacities are not expanded and priced in a non-discriminatory way, market liberalization in Europe is unlikely to display all its potential benefits, also from the environmental point of view.
However, our results require a number of qualifications. For one thing, the numerical model in its present form, hinges on some arbitrary hypotheses. In particular the values chosen for transmission costs, transmission capacities, marginal damages of emissions, CO 2 tax rate, elasticity of demand, mark-ups on costs in 2000 are all based on educated guesses or at best, adapted from studies not immune from uncertainties (such as, for instance ExternE estimates for external damages).
Moreover, some equations of the model are quite rough representations of the real constraints that they are supposed to depict. In particular, international flow equations disregard Kirkhoff's laws, transboundary pollution is included only in the sense that CO 2 marginal damages are the same everywhere, but no transboundary matrix has been included, and trade to countries other than the four included in the model is not considered, not even as residual trade. Our on-going research is directed to overcome these drawbacks and also to include other policy scenarios such as the Directive Proposal on renewable energy sources 19 .
Our preliminary results indicate that imposing renewable source quotas to European countries can involve serious welfare losses in absence of flexible implementation instruments. 19 
See European Commission (2000)
Appendix A : Description of the Numerical Model
Our model considers the dynamic equilibrium for the electricity sector of four neighbouring European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany. The model is dynamic in the sense that the electricity market equilibrium is modelled for a long time horizon . Such a time span is sufficient to cover the long lifetimes that power production investments generally have, and hence the main differences between nuclear power generation and other technologies can be properly highlighted. In fact, in order to judge the opportunity of a new technology, one has to examine its functioning taking into account the available production capacities over the lifetime of the new power plant. Thus, a dynamic setting allows us to take into full consideration the consequences in terms of technology choice of the various policy scenarios we analyse. We assume that all agents have perfect foresight.
Our model consists of:
• A supply module for electricity generation in each country;
• A demand module for electricity in each country;
• An environmental module describing external damages caused by electricity generation in each country;
• A regulatory module describing environmental targets binding for electricity generation in each country;
• A transmission module describing how electricity can be physically exchanged in the international market;
We consider six sub-periods within a year (base, load, medium, shoulder, high, and peak) all having the same length across the four countries. In each country, a single electric utility supplies electricity to the national and international grids using the following technologies:
NP
• Finally, we compute our policy scenarios. We compare outcomes under perfect competition to outcomes under Cournot competition.
A number of constraints further define our problem, and are always present in the three stages described.
Firstly 21 , generated electricity actually supplied at each node, must equal demand at that node.
i n n t i n m z i m n t m z i n Q loss X lgt α θ
Moreover, each electric producer must take into account capacity constraints for its power plants and reserve constraints for national grids, in order to assure enough supply of electricity even in peak periods. requires that the same capacity must be sufficient to cover demand in each period plus a reserve margin. Implicitly, it amounts to assuming that each country is in principle selfsufficient, and that trade occurs for comparative efficiency reasons.
Existent environmental policy is taken into account in terms of unit emissions specifications of the plants and in the form of maximum allowed NO x and SO 2 emissions from Dutch and Belgian Plants. The latter are specified in the model by means of the following constraints: Finally international electricity sales are constrained by the capacity and the shape of the grid. Since this is rather complex, we will now describe it in detail here.
In order to understand how we model the international transmission of electricity, consider Figure A1 . As shown in the figure, we assume that there are direct interconnections between any couple of countries but the Netherlands and France, and that there are two separate lines 21 In what follows, production z,i,n,m,t X is indexed not only for the period and sub-period in which it is produced, the firm that produces it, the technology used for production, but also for the country where it is generated and the country where it is sent. This allow us to regard the sum of 
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connecting any couple of interconnected countries, one for each flow direction. Therefore, electricity traded at any moment between the Netherlands and France must be transmitted using the existing links connecting them with the other two countries, and using the transmission capacity not utilized in that moment for direct trade between countries directly interconnected. For instance, if the French producer sells i ,t X MW to the Dutch market at time i of year t, this amount of electricity may reach its destination either passing trough Germany or passing trough Belgium, but only if at that moment there is enough transmission capacity on the links between France and Germany, Germany and the Netherlands, and/or between France and Belgium, Belgium and the Netherlands. Of course this also influences what can be directly traded between countries that have a direct interconnection. The actual capacity of these lines is then reduced by what is used in order to allow trade between The Netherlands and France.
We take, however, some simplifying assumptions. In particular:
• All transmission lines entail the same transmission cost. This incidentally implies that the transmission cost between France and the Netherlands is double the cost between any two directly interconnected countries;
• Electricity follows the most direct path to any destination. Hence, we rule out the possibility that in order to go from France to the Netherlands (and vice versa), electricity will use the Belgium-Germany lines as well. Figure A1 . The international grid Let n ,m ,i ,t qb be the share of electricity that goes from country n to country m passing trough Belgium, and let n ,m ,i ,t qd be the share of electricity that goes from country n to country m passing trough Germany. Formally, we then represent the structure of the international grid by means of the following equations. 
Perfect competition benchmark
With the parameters of the demand function in hand, we can compute the perfect competition equilibrium. By definition, in such equilibrium the surplus of consumers and producers are maximised, taking prices as given. The perfect competition equilibrium can therefore be mimicked by solving the following problem: z i n m t n z t n t m t i n z i n m t n X n m 
is the consumers surplus and where n C is defined in (A.8) .
Policy scenarios under perfect and oligopolistic competition
In order to allow comparison among the results of our scenarios, we assume that for all of them the situation in 2000-2004 is the outcome, for those years, of the benchmark model described in the previous section. We then run our simulations from 2005, keeping fixed the levels of all decision variables in 2000-2004. Under perfect competition, this amounts to solving problem (A.10) from 2005 onwards, subjects to the policy constraints defining each scenario. These constraints will be described in detail in the next section.
Suppose then that firms behave in a non-competitive way in the international electricity market. In any given year t, at each node m, consumers are prepared to pay for each MWh purchased a price ( ) m,t z,i,n,m,t z,i,-n,m,t m,t m,t i,n z,i,n,m, 
